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THE TIME FOR A UNIFORM FIDUCIARY 
DUTY IS NOW 
RYAN K. BAKHTIARI† 
KATRINA BOICE†† 
JEFFREY S. MAJORS††† 
INTRODUCTION 
Warren Buffet famously said, “It’s only when the tide goes 
out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.”1  The 2008 
mortgage meltdown brought to light fraud of an unprecedented 
nature, perpetrated through the sale of defective or fraudulent 
securities.2  With investor confidence already shaken by the 
Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Tyco scandals, banks 
peddled high-risk mortgages to less-than-creditworthy borrowers 
chasing the American dream of home ownership.  When 
mortgages and the housing market unraveled, chaos followed.   
The 2008 collapse led to the government-brokered sale of 
Bear Stearns, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the fire sales of 
Merrill Lynch and Wachovia, and government takeovers of AIG 
and Washington Mutual.  Billion dollar Ponzi schemes 
orchestrated by Bernard L. Madoff, R. Allan Stanford, and Scott 
W. Rothstein, and product scandals like the Abacus CDO 
placement, which demonstrated how large investment banks 
take substantial positions against their own customers, have 
rocked investor confidence.  The disappearance of customer 
money at MF Global, reports of LIBOR rigging by multinational 
 
† Partner, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari. 
†† Associate, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari. 
††† Counsel, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. 
1 Alex Crippen, Warren Buffett and the Perils of Swimming Naked, CNBC (Aug. 
6, 2007, 1:38 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 20147026/Warren_Buffett_and_the_ 
Perils_of_Swimming_Naked. 
2 See, e.g., Bozeman Man Faces Up to 200 Years for Investment Scam, MONT. 
COMM’R OF SEC. & INS. (Mar. 22, 2012), http://sao.mt.gov/news/2012/03222012_ 
reynoldswanted.asp (describing a Ponzi scheme victimizing individuals from twenty-
one states and six countries). 
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banks, the recent near collapse of market-maker Knight Capital, 
and the botched Facebook IPO provide constant reminders to 
Main Street investors who were wiped out by Wall Street.  In 
isolation, these events are problematic.  Together, they 
emphasize the economic reality that the time for a strong broad-
based fiduciary duty is now.   
The 2008 collapse focused attention on how to better protect 
investors from securities sellers and advisers who purport to offer 
unbiased advice, yet do not disclose meaningful conflicts of 
interest.  The push to protect ordinary investors by imposing a 
uniform fiduciary duty for brokers and investment advisers has 
gained momentum.3  This Article examines differences in the 
standard of care currently owed by financial professionals and 
the arguments for and against imposing a uniform fiduciary 
standard.   
I. THE 2008 CREDIT CRISIS REQUIRES REMEDIAL ACTION 
In the years leading up to the 2008 meltdown, investors were 
sold securities marketed as safe, secure, and income-producing 
by investment advisers and broker-dealers.  In truth, investors 
were sold funds that owned toxic tranches of subprime mortgage 
securities and other byproducts of the real estate boom.  In 2009, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
Chairman, Mary L. Schapiro, recognized that these complex 
financial products impaired an investor’s ability to make an 
informed decision:   
  This marketplace demands that we constantly find new 
approaches and strategies, build new tools and think of new 
ways to out-compete the competition.   
  This push for innovation constantly changes the face of the 
financial industry, as smart minds discover new ways to create 
wealth or manage risk.  No doubt, great good can come from 
this.  It can enable vibrant markets where entrepreneurs can 
access the capital they need to transform their vision into new 
products and personal success.   
  But innovation creates challenges as well.   
 
3 Sharon Epperson & Chris Murphey, Debate Continues Over Standards for 
Advisors, Broker-Dealers, CNBC (May 11, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/ 
42650944/Debate_Continues_Over_Standards_for_Advisors_Broker_Dealers; Tara 
Siegel Bernard, Dear S.E.C., Please Make Brokers Accountable to Customers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at B1.  
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  It can foster incredibly complex financial products that fail to 
live up to buyers’ expectations, but generate fees for their 
creators and sellers.  This complexity can bury important 
information needed for effective decision-making, so that even 
the most sophisticated are unable to make informed judgments 
about risk and payoff.  Finally, it can mask old-fashioned 
manipulation and fraud.   
  But whether innovation is used for good or ill, to improve the 
system or to manipulate it—it creates a challenge for regulators 
with limited resources trying to keep up with the industries 
they regulate.   
  This was particularly true when I became Chairman of the 
SEC in late January 2009 in the wake of the financial crisis.4   
Since the marketplace is ever-changing, which in turn 
creates the development of complex financial products, the need 
for a uniform fiduciary standard is essential so that customers 
can be certain that their interests are protected no matter which 
type of industry professional recommends the purchase of an 
investment.   
II. INVESTMENT ADVISERS VS. BROKER-DEALERS 
There are two primary types of professionals that investors 
seek for advice and services: investment advisers and broker-
dealers.5  Although the two are nearly identical in that they 
provide customized financial advice to customers, they are 
currently regulated by separate securities acts and adhere to 
different standards of conduct.6  In recent years, a hybrid model 
has emerged whereby financial professionals are registered as 
both brokers and investment advisers, resulting in dual 
registration.7   
 
4 Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Brodsky Family Lecture 
at Northwestern University School of Law (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch110910mls.htm. 
5 Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010). 
6 Id. at 701–02. 
7 See Dan LeGaye, Dual Registration and FINRA Supervision, PRAC. 
COMPLIANCE & RISK MGMT. FOR THE SEC. INDUSTRY 17 (May–June 2010), available 
at http://www.legayelaw.com/file/201005%20Article%20-%20Dual%20Registration. 
pdf (noting the supervisory issues relating to dual registration); see also U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS iii 
(2011) [hereinafter STAFF STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
2011/913studyfinal.pdf (“Approximately 5% of Commission-registered investment 
advisers are also registered as broker-dealers, and . . . [a]pproximately 18% of 
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A. Investment Advisers 
As of May 2012, there were more than 12,600 investment 
advisers registered with the SEC with nearly $50 trillion in 
assets under management.8  “This represents a 9% increase in 
the number of advisers registered with the [SEC] since July 
2011.”9  The SEC, under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(“Advisers Act”), regulates investment advisers.10  The Advisers 
Act defines an “investment adviser” as  
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.11   
Under the Advisers Act, investment advisers are held to a 
“fiduciary” standard of care.12  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,13 is the most 
commonly cited source for the investment adviser fiduciary duty, 
wherein the Court held that an investment adviser has a 
fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act.14  The SEC has recognized 
that “[i]t is not entirely clear whether the federal fiduciary duty 
established by the Court in Capital Gains is an example of judge-
made common law, an interpretation of the Section 206 of the 
Advisers Act.”15  Nonetheless, the SEC has confirmed that 
“[t]here is no doubt, however, that an investment adviser is 
subject to the federal fiduciary duty.”16  Further, the SEC has 
 
FINRA-registered broker-dealers also are registered as investment advisers with the 
Commission or a state.”). 
8 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Advocating for Greater 
Federal and State Securities Regulatory Cooperation and Collaboration (May 7, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch050712laa.htm. 
9 Id. 
10 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b–1 to –21 (2012). 
11 § 80b–2(a)(11). 
12 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963). 
13 Id. at 180. 
14 Id. at 191–92 (noting other courts have found that Congress recognized that 
an investment advisor is a fiduciary with “an affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, 
and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ as well as an affirmative obligation 
‘to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading’ his clients”). 
15 Memorandum from the Investor as Purchaser Subcomm. 3–4 (Feb. 15, 2010) 
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/ 
iacmemofiduciaryduty.pdf. 
16 Id. at 4. 
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recognized that the fiduciary duty standard includes the duties of 
loyalty and care, which require investment advisers to put the 
interests of clients ahead of their own and to disclose or eliminate 
material conflicts of interest.17   
B. Broker-Dealers 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
oversees approximately 4,245 brokerage firms, 162,230 branch 
offices, and 633,150 registered-representatives.18  The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) regulates the business 
activities of broker-dealers.19  The Exchange Act defines “broker” 
to mean “any person engaged in the business of effecting 
transactions in securities for the account of others”20 and “dealer” 
to mean “any person engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities . . . for such person’s own account through a 
broker or otherwise.”21  Although the SEC has authority to adopt 
federal standards of competence,22 the specific rules applicable to 
the broker-dealer profession are proscribed and enforced by 
FINRA.23   
Since broker-dealers are generally excluded from the 
Advisers Act, they are not subject to a federal “fiduciary” 
standard of care. 24  Instead, and in the absence of a higher 
 
17 See STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 22. 
18 About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA (last visited Aug. 1, 2013); see STAFF STUDY, 
supra note 7 (“The Commission and FINRA oversee approximately 5,100 broker-
dealers. As of the end of 2009, FINRA-registered broker-dealers held over 109 
million retail and institutional accounts.”). 
19 See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, 48 
Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012)). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). 
21 Id.  § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
22 Barbara Black, How To Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 63 
(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7), (c)(2)(D)). 
23 See Get to Know Us, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/ 
@corp/@about/documents/corporate/p118667.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) 
(explaining that part of FINRA's duties are “writing and enforcing rules governing 
the activities of nearly 4,400 securities firms with approximately 630,000 brokers”); 
see also Black, supra note 22, at 63. 
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (excluding any broker or dealer whose services 
are solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who 
does not receive any compensation for such services); see also Memorandum, supra 
note 15, at 5–6 (“The broker [dealer] exclusion [to the Advisers Act] is available if 
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standard imposed by case law, broker-dealers are held to a 
“suitability” standard of care under FINRA Rules.  FINRA rules 
require broker-dealers to deal fairly and honestly with customers 
in accordance with industry standards, to recommend only 
“suitable” investments, and to seek the best execution for 
customers’ orders.25  Newly adopted FINRA Rule 2111 sets forth 
the “suitability” standard of care as follows:   
(a) A member or an associated person must have a reasonable 
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment 
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer, based on the information obtained through the 
reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to 
ascertain the customer’s investment profile.  A customer’s 
investment profile includes, but is not limited to, the customer’s 
age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax 
status, investment objectives, investment experience, 
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and 
any other information the customer may disclose to the member 
or associated person in connection with such recommendation.   
(b) A member or associated person fulfills the customer-specific 
suitability obligation for an institutional account, as defined in 
Rule 4512(c), if (1) the member or associated person has a 
reasonable basis to believe that the institutional customer is 
capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in 
general and with regard to particular transactions and 
investment strategies involving a security or securities and (2) 
the institutional customer affirmatively indicates that it is 
exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member’s or 
associated person’s recommendations.  Where an institutional 
customer has delegated decisionmaking authority to an agent, 
such as an investment adviser or a bank trust department, 
these factors shall be applied to the agent.26   
 
 
two conditions are satisfied: (1) no special compensation is received and (2) the 
advice is solely incidental to the broker’s brokerage activities.”). 
25 See FINRA Rule 2111, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859; FINRA Rule 5310, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=104
55; see also NASD Rule 2310, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638 (superseded by FINRA Rule 2111). 
26 FINRA Rule 2111. This rule was introduced with the filing of SR-FINRA-
2010-039, which was approved by the SEC and effective as of July 9, 2012. Id. Prior 
to July 9, 2012, NASD Rule 2310, Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), 
governed broker-dealers’ “suitability” standard of care. See NASD Rule 2310. 
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Although FINRA Rule 2111 recognizes that broker-dealers’ 
duties to the customer are not limited to the point of purchase of 
investments, the “suitability” standard is less than the standard 
of care afforded by a fiduciary standard.27   
III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BROKERS AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS IS UNCLEAR TO THE PUBLIC 
In 2008, the SEC commissioned the RAND Corporation to 
determine the effectiveness of existing regulations for brokers 
and investment advisers.28  The RAND report acknowledged:  “In 
recent years, the evolution of the financial service industry has 
blurred traditional distinctions between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers and made it difficult to design appropriate 
regulatory schemes for their professional services.”29  The report 
indicated that many investors “do not understand key 
distinctions between investment advisers and broker-dealers—
their duties, the titles they use, the firms for which they work, or 
the services they offer.” 30  The survey results demonstrated that 
63% of investors believe brokers provide advice about securities 
as part of their regular business; 51% of investors believe brokers 
recommend specific investments; 42% of investors believe brokers 
are required by law to act in the client’s best interest, i.e., that 
brokers owe their customers a fiduciary duty; and 58% of 
investors believe brokers are required by law to disclose conflicts 
of interest.31   
Obvious factors contributing to investor confusion are the 
“[m]arketplace changes that have resulted in investment 
advisers and broker-dealers offering similar services.”32  
 
27 See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12–25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on 
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule, at 6–7 (May 2012), http://www.finra.org/ 
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p126431.pdf (noting that 
recommendations to hold securities, maintain or change investment strategies, or 
buy or sell securities does not create an ongoing obligation to monitor and make 
additional recommendations). 
28 ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS iii (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf. RAND is a “nonprofit research organization 
providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges 
facing the public and private sectors around the world.” Id. at ii. 
29 Id. at iii. 
30 Id. at 112–13. 
31 Id. at 89. 
32 Id. at 20. 
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Traditionally, the primary role of a broker-dealer was to execute 
securities transactions on the client’s behalf.33  Technological 
advances and the deregulation of commissions on securities 
transactions have impacted the profitability of this role.34  In 
response, broker-dealers began to provide additional financial 
planning services and use titles such as “adviser” or “financial 
adviser” for their broker-dealer registered representatives.35   
The following year, the Obama Administration released a 
plan for financial reform.36  President Barack Obama stated it 
would be “a transformation on a scale not seen since the reforms 
that followed the Great Depression.”37  The plan, referred to as 
the “White Paper,”38 sought to end the financial crisis and 
“restore confidence in the integrity of our financial system.”39  
The White Paper acknowledged that the government could have 
done more to prevent many of the problems that contributed or 
resulted from the 2008 financial crisis.40  In response, the White 
Paper laid out five reforms through which the administration 
sought to: (1) “[p]romote robust supervision and regulation of 
financial firms”; (2) “[e]stablish comprehensive supervision of 
financial markets”; (3) “[p]rotect consumers and investors from  
 
 
33 Ross Jordan, Note, Thinking Before Rulemaking: Why the SEC Should Think 
Twice Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisors, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 496 (2012) (citing Laby, supra 
note 5, at 423–24). 
34 Id. 
35 See id. at 496–97 (citing Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties of Brokers-
Advisers-Financial Planners and Money Managers 10–11 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 09-36, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1446750 (discussing the expanded list of services offered by many 
broker-dealers)); Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 404 (2010); see also Laby, supra note 5, at 
734 (“Today, advances in technology have reduced the time and cost to process 
trades. As a result, the advice component of brokerage business has eclipsed 
transaction execution in importance.”). 
36 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on 21st 
Century Fin. Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (on file with author). 
37 Id. 
38 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, President Obama To Announce 
Comprehensive Plan for Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009) (on file with author); 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter 
WHITE PAPER]. 
39 WHITE PAPER, supra note 38, at 2. 
40 Id. 
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financial abuse”; (4) “[p]rovide the government with the tools it 
needs to manage financial crises”; and (5) “[r]aise international 
regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.”41   
The White Paper was consistent with the RAND report and 
cited confusion among investors regarding the disparity between 
regulations governing broker-dealers and investment advisers.42  
The White Paper noted, “the legal distinction between the two is 
no longer meaningful.  Retail customers repose the same degree 
of trust in their brokers as they do in investment advisers, but 
the legal responsibilities of the intermediaries may not be the 
same.”43  In an effort to address the confusion, the White Paper 
recommended that Congress “empower the SEC to increase 
fairness for investors” by “[e]stablish[ing] a fiduciary duty for 
broker-dealers offering investment advice and harmonize the 
regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers.”44  The 
White Paper further emphasized: 
Standards of care for all broker-dealers when providing 
investment advice about securities to retail investors should be 
raised to the fiduciary standard to align the legal framework 
with investment advisers.  In addition, the SEC should be 
empowered to examine and ban forms of compensation that 
encourage intermediaries to put investors into products that are 
profitable to the intermediary, but are not in the investors’ best 
interest.45   
The White Paper “formed the basis of the broad-based 
legislative review of financial services regulation that culminated 
in the Dodd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act].”46   
Following the publication of the RAND report and White 
Paper, regulators recognized the need to hold broker-dealers to 
the same standard of conduct as investment advisers.  Mary 
Schapiro told participants at a Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (“SIFMA”) conference:  “I believe that  
 
 
41 Id. at 3–4. 
42 Id. at 71. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 71–72. 
46 MERCER BULLARD, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, PROTECTING 
INVESTORS—ESTABLISHING THE SEC FIDUCIARY DUTY STANDARD 3 (2011), available 
at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/091311aarpreport.pdf. 
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broker-dealers and investment advisers providing the same 
services, especially to retail investors, should meet that same 
high fiduciary standard . . . .”47   
IV. DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT 
On July 21, 2010, a little more than a year after the White 
Paper was published, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act48 was signed into law with the mission 
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer 
by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”49  Dodd-Frank 
recognized investors’ confusion and lack of confidence in the 
financial system by enacting section 913, Study and Rulemaking 
Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment 
Advisers.  Section 913 required the SEC to conduct a study to 
evaluate:  
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of 
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons 
associated with brokers or dealers, and persons associated with 
investment advisers for providing personalized investment 
advice and recommendations about securities to retail 
customers imposed by the Commission and a national securities 
association, and other Federal and State legal or regulatory 
standards; and  
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or 
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of 
retail customers relating to the standards of care for brokers, 
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or 
dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers for 
providing personalized investment advice about securities to 
retail customers that should be addressed by rule or statute.50 
 
47 Ronald D. Orol, SEC: Broker-Dealers Should Be Held to Fiduciary Standard, 
MARKETWATCH, May 6, 2010, http://articles.marketwatch.com/2010-05-06/economy/ 
30747556_1_dealers-bank-reform-schapiro. 
48 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet 
reform-cpa.pdf. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. § 913(b)(1). 
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Section 913 required the SEC to conduct a study examining 
existing standards of care for broker-dealers and investment 
advisers and to evaluate whether imposing a fiduciary standard 
on broker-dealers would ensure that investors are receiving 
appropriate and tailored investment advice from broker-
dealers.51   
V. SEC CONCLUSIONS 
On January 22, 2011, the SEC fulfilled the mandate under 
section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act by releasing its Study 
Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for 
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers (“Staff Study”).52  As is 
evidenced from the title of the Staff Study, “[t]he overarching 
recommendation in the [Staff] Study is that the SEC should 
adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for investment advisers and 
broker-dealers.”53  Specifically, the Staff Study provided:   
Consistent with Congress’s grant of authority in Section 913, 
the Staff recommends the consideration of rulemakings that 
would apply expressly and uniformly to both broker-dealers and 
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment 
advice about securities to retail customers, a fiduciary standard 
no less stringent than currently applied to investment advisers 
under Advisers Act Sections 206(1) and (2).  In particular, the 
Staff recommends that the Commission exercise its rulemaking 
authority under Dodd-Frank Act Section 913(g), which permits 
the Commission to promulgate rules to provide that: 
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and 
investment advisers, when providing personalized 
investment advice about securities to retail customers (and 
such other customers as the Commission may by rule  
 
 
 
 
 
51 Jordan, supra note 33, at 491–92; see § 913(c)(5) (amending the Exchange Act 
and the Advisers Act to grant the SEC the authority to establish a fiduciary duty  
for broker-dealers “when providing personalized investment advice and 
recommendations about securities to retail customers”). 
52 Jordan, supra note 33, at 499; Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC 
Releases Staff Study Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for 
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers (Jan. 22, 2011) (on file with author); STAFF 
STUDY, supra note 7, at ii. 
53 Jordan, supra note 33, at 499. 
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provide), shall be to act in the best interest of the customer 
without regard to the financial or other interest of the 
broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.54   
In conducting the Study, the Staff met with interested 
parties, representatives of the financial services industry, state 
securities regulators, the North American Securities 
Administrator Association (“NASAA”), and FINRA.55  
Additionally, the Staff reviewed over 3,500 comment letters 
many of which stated, inter alia, that investors are confused 
about the differences between investment advisers and broker-
dealers and the standards of conduct applicable to each.56  In 
response, the Staff Study recommended the implementation of a 
uniform fiduciary duty to “increase investor protection and 
decrease investor confusion in the most practicable, least 
burdensome way for investors, broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.”57   
The Staff Study identified key components of a uniform 
fiduciary duty standard as being the duties of loyalty and care.58  
The Staff Study recommended that, in implementing a uniform 
fiduciary standard, the SEC “should engage in rulemaking and/or 
issue interpretive guidance addressing the[se] components.”59  
Specifically, the Staff Study noted that the duty of loyalty 
requires eliminating and/or disclosing conflicts of interest and 
recommended that the SEC “prohibit certain conflicts and 
facilitate the provision of uniform, simple and clear disclosures to 
retail investors about the terms of their relationships with 
broker-dealers and investment advisers, including any material 
conflicts of interest.”60  As for the duty of care, the Staff Study 
 
54 STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v–vi (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act § 913(g)); Jordan, supra note 33, at 499. 
55 STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at ii; Jordan, supra note 33, at 499. 
56 STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v (“Many retail investors and investor 
advocates submitted comments stating that retail investors do not understand the 
differences between investment advisers and broker-dealers or the standards of care 
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. Many find the standards of 
care confusing, and are uncertain about the meaning of the various titles and 
designations used by investment advisers and broker-dealers. Many expect that both 
investment advisers and broker-dealers are obligated to act in the investors’ best 
interests.”); Jordan, supra note 33, at 499. 
57 STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at v. 
58 See id. at vii. 
59 Id. at vi. 
60 Id. at vii. (As part of the disclosures required under the duty of loyalty, the 
Study recommended that the SEC consider: “which disclosures might be provided 
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recommended the SEC specify uniform standards for the 
standard of care owed to retail investors, including the basis for 
making recommendations to an investor.”61   
In addition to the duties of loyalty and care, the Staff Study 
recommended that the SEC “address through interpretative 
guidance and/or rule making how broker-dealers should fulfill 
the uniform fiduciary standard when engaging in principal 
trading”; “engage in rulecmaking and/or issue interpretive 
guidance to explain what it means to provide ‘personalized 
investment advice about securities’ ”; and consider “investor 
education outreach as an important complement to the uniform 
fiduciary standard.”62   
The SEC concluded that imposing a uniform fiduciary 
standard would provide the following benefits: heightened 
investor protection and awareness; flexibility to accommodate 
diverse business models and fee structures; preservation of 
investor choice; continued investor access to existing products, 
services, and service providers; continued duties under applicable 
law for investment advisers and broker-dealers; and receipt of 
investment advice that is in an investor’s best interest.63   
A. SEC Commissioners Found Shortcomings in the Staff Study 
SEC commissioners, Kathleen L. Casey and Troy A. Paredes, 
found shortcomings in the Staff Study, stating:   
[T]he Study’s pervasive shortcoming is that it fails to 
adequately justify its recommendation that the Commission 
embark on fundamentally changing the regulatory regime for 
broker-dealers and investment advisers providing personalized 
investment advice to retail investors[;]  
The Study recommends the adoption of a new uniform fiduciary 
duty standard and harmonization of two disparate regulatory 
regimes.  But it does so without adequate articulation or 
substantiation of the problems that would purportedly be 
addressed via that regulation[;]  
 
most effectively”; “the utility and feasibility of a summary relationship disclosure 
document”; and “whether rulemaking would be appropriate to prohibit certain 
conflicts, to require firms to mitigate conflicts through specific action, or to impose 
specific disclosure and consent requirements.”). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at viii. 
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The Study also does not adequately recognize the risk that its 
recommendations could adversely impact investors[;]  
. . . . 
. . . [W]e oppose the Study’s release to Congress as drafted.  We 
do not believe the Study fulfills the statutory mandate of 
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act to evaluate the ‘effectiveness 
of existing legal or regulatory standards of care’ applicable to 
broker-dealers and investment advisers[;] 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he practical consequences resulting from that confusion 
for those very investors have not been sufficiently studied or 
documented.  Moreover, the Study does not address the 
possibility that the Study’s own recommendations will not 
resolve or eliminate investor confusion and may in fact create 
new sources of confusion[;] 
. . . The Study unduly discounts the risk that, as a result of the 
regulatory burdens imposed by the recommendations on 
financial professionals, investors may have fewer broker-dealers 
and investment advisers to choose from, may have access to 
fewer products and services, and may have to pay more for the 
services and advice they do receive[;] 
. . . . 
. . . Regulation based on poorly-supported recommendations 
runs the risk of restricting retail investors’ access to affordable 
personalized investment advice and the range of products and 
services they currently enjoy.64   
In addition, Casey and Paredes observed that there is no 
statutory deadline for any follow-up rulemaking to the Staff 
Study, and additional research and analysis are needed before 
rules are proposed to determine:   
[I]nvestor returns (controlling for risk and investor 
characteristics such as age, income, and education) generated 
under the two existing regulatory regimes[;] 
Comparison of the security selections of financial professionals 
subject to the two existing regulatory regimes in an effort to 
gauge differences in the quality of advice or types of product 
recommendations as a function of the regulatory regimes[;] 
Surveys of investors to obtain a general overview of the 
characteristics of investors who invest through a broker-dealer 
 
64 Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement by SEC Commissioners: Statement Regarding Study on Investment 
Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch012211klctap.htm. 
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as compared to those who invest on the basis of advice from an 
investment adviser and to develop an understanding of investor 
perceptions of the cost/benefit tradeoffs of each regulatory 
regime[;] 
Consideration of evidence related to the ability of investors to 
bring claims against their financial professional under each 
regulatory regime, with a particular focus on dollar costs to the 
investor and the results when claims are brought.65   
B. Timetable for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Remains 
Undetermined 
On April 9, 2012, the SEC announced the formation of a new 
Investor Advisory Committee.66  The purpose of the Investor 
Advisory Committee is “to advise the Commission on regulatory 
priorities, the regulation of securities products, trading 
strategies, fee structures, the effectiveness of disclosure, and on 
initiatives to protect investor interests and to promote investor 
confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace.”67  
Currently, the SEC’s website reflects that the rule 
implementation timetable has been extended and remains 
undetermined.68   
C. The Arguments for and Against a Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
Standard 
While both sides generally agree that some form of a uniform 
fiduciary duty should be imposed,69 positions are split on how the 
standard imposed should be defined, how far it should reach in 
relation to the standard currently owed by investment advisers, 
and the extent to which an equivalent standard would benefit or 
 
65 Id. 
66 Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, SEC Announces Members of New 
Investor Advisory Committee (April 9, 2012) (on file with author). 
67 Id. 
68 Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—
Pending Action, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/ 
dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last modified July 10, 2013). 
69 STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 107 (“Many commenters supported a uniform 
standard of conduct in some form for investment advisers and broker-dealers 
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail customers. These 
commenters include investors’ advocates, trade groups, state regulators, government 
officials, a self-regulatory organization [(FINRA)], industry representatives 
(including investment advisers, broker-dealers, and dually registered firms), 
coalition groups, academics, investors, and other individuals.”). 
FINAL_BAKHTIARI, BOICE & MAJORS 2/27/2014  6:20 PM 
328 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:313   
harm those it is intended to protect.70  With positions divided 
between retail investors and investor-advocates on one side, and 
brokers, investment advisers, and insurers on the other,71 the 
case for and against imposing a uniform standard of fiduciary 
care for financial professionals has gained momentum.   
1. Retail Investors and Investor Advocates Argue that a 
Uniform Fiduciary Duty Will Fuel Investor Protection and 
Close the Gap on Inconsistent Regulation of Financial 
Professionals 
For retail investors and investor-advocates, the argument is 
simple: imposing a uniform fiduciary duty for brokers and 
investment advisers will make it easier to understand the 
obligations owed by trusted financial professionals, regardless of 
the hat they wear at the time of sale.72  While it used to be easy 
to understand the difference between brokers and investment 
advisers acting in their traditional roles, the digital age, the rise 
of discount brokerages, and the emergence of one-stop-shops have 
changed what used to be separate and distinct roles into hybrid 
roles with significant overlap.73  As a result, it has become 
difficult to distinguish financial professionals acting in the broker 
role from financial professionals acting in the investment adviser 
role—even for those with specialized knowledge of the industry.74   
 
 
70 See Bonnie M. Treichel, Note, The Quest for Financial Regulatory Reform: 
Will a Uniform Fiduciary Standard Guide the Way?, 4 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
& L. 151, 171–74 (2010). 
71 See id. (discussing the arguments put forth for and against a uniform 
fiduciary duty). 
72 Id. at 171 (“[A] uniform fiduciary standard will provide a more 
understandable system in which investors who seek to impose liability on their 
financial providers will not be confused as to the applicable standard [of care].”); see 
STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 101 (“Therefore, in light of this confusion and lack of 
understanding, it is important that retail investors be protected uniformly when 
receiving personalized investment advice or recommendations about securities 
regardless of whether they choose to work with an investment adviser or a broker-
dealer.”). 
73 See Treichel, supra note 70, at 160; see also STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 99 
(noting RAND’s conclusions that over the last few decades the financial services 
market has become more complex due to “market demands for new products and 
services and the regulatory environment”). 
74 See id. (stating how providing increasingly similar services confuses the retail 
investor). 
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Since retail investors often lack specialized knowledge of the 
industry, they are likely to view the role of a financial 
professional as a financial professional, instead of as a financial 
professional acting as a broker or financial adviser.75  With roles 
easily confused, investors are unlikely to understand that the 
role their financial professional is acting in will determine 
whether they are owed continuing obligations from an 
investment adviser or point of sale obligations from a broker 
performing the same function.76  A uniform fiduciary duty for 
financial professionals will remove much of investors’ confusion 
by the different outcomes when investors bring claims against 
brokers and investment advisers for breach of their professional 
obligations.77   
In addition, investor advocates note the added benefit of 
requiring brokers to disclose conflicts of interest they might not 
otherwise disclose under the existing suitability standard as a 
significant benefit of a uniform fiduciary duty.78  Under the 
status quo, suitability requires brokers to ensure the products 
they sell are suitable to the needs of clients and their individual 
risk tolerances at the time of sale.79  As such, it does not require 
disclosure of all material conflicts of interest inherent in the sale 
itself, such as when the broker knows the broker-dealer is betting 
against the product being sold or when a broker’s interest in 
higher-commission products conflicts with the client’s interest in 
 
75 See STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 97–99 (discussing the results of an investor 
survey that found investors did not understand the difference between investment 
advisers and broker-dealers but assumed both acted in the investor’s best interests). 
Meanwhile,  
Americans seek investment advice, products, and services to help achieve a 
variety of goals, such as retirement planning, estate and insurance 
planning, educational needs, and the operation of small businesses. Baby 
boomers control roughly $13 trillion in household investable assets, or over 
50 percent of total U.S. household investment assets, and nearly one in 
every six Americans will be 65 or older by the year 2020.  
Id. at 93–94. 
76 See id. at i (stating that investors do not understand that investment advisors 
and broker-dealers are subject to different legal obligations and standards of care). 
77 See id. at 107 (recommending a uniform fiduciary standard because investors 
“should not have to parse the title on a business card or other information to assess 
whether the professional has their best interests at heart”). 
78 See Treichel, supra note 70, at 170. 
79 See id. at 157 (describing how under the suitability standard, reasonable 
efforts must be made to assure that a recommendation comports with a customer’s 
objective and financial status). 
FINAL_BAKHTIARI, BOICE & MAJORS 2/27/2014  6:20 PM 
330 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:313   
higher-return, lower commission products.80  Adhering to a 
standard of care equal to that owed by investment advisers 
would require brokers to place the interests of investors ahead of 
their own and to disclose conflicts of interest that might not 
otherwise be disclosed.81   
On the regulatory front, Congress and investor advocates 
note that a uniform standard will close the gap on inconsistent 
regulation of brokers and investment advisers, making the 
regulatory framework for financial professionals easier to enforce 
than it is under the status quo.82  With brokers held to a lesser 
suitability standard while investment advisers are held to higher 
fiduciary standard, and brokers primarily regulated by FINRA 
while investment advisers are regulated by the SEC, regulation 
is inconsistent at best and inadequate in fact.  The state of 
regulation is best seen in the reality that brokers “are examined 
[for compliance] by either FINRA or the SEC at least once a 
year,” while investment advisers “are generally only examined by 
the SEC once every decade.”83  With compliance examination 
occurring more often for brokers than investment advisers, 
imposing a uniform fiduciary duty for financial professionals will 
bridge the gap of inconsistent regulation of brokers and 
investment advisers as trusted financial professionals, making 
the regulatory framework for financial professionals easier to 
enforce throughout the financial industry.   
2. Brokers and Insurers Argue that a Uniform Fiduciary Duty 
Will Force the Overhaul of Existing Business Models, Will 
Create Costs Shifted to Retail Investors, and Will Force Ad 
Hoc Responses Proponents Failed To Consider 
Wall Street argues that adhering to a uniform fiduciary duty 
is not so simple for brokers and insurers, whose business models 
will be affected by a higher standard of care.84  It argues that 
business models will change, creating costs to be shifted to retail 
 
80 See id. at 170 n.110 (explaining that certain investments will result in higher 
commission levels than others for brokers working for a brokerage firm having its 
own products to sell). 
81 See id. at 170. 
82 See Bullard, supra note 46, at 9 (discussing Congress’s intent to “harmonize” 
the enforcement of rules applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers). 
83 Treichel, supra note 70, at 166. 
84 See id. at 173–74 (arguing that a universal fiduciary standard will make it 
impossible to conduct business as usual). 
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investors in the form of higher fees and reduced competition.85  
Broker-dealers also argue that requiring a higher standard will 
require ad hoc rule making by the SEC, will necessitate the 
consolidation of enforcement under a single SRO, and will open 
the doors to legal challenges for failure to properly explore the 
compound effects of a higher standard of care on industry 
stakeholders.86   
Opponents of the uniform fiduciary standard claim that this 
will lead to an increase in the costs of doing business throughout 
the financial industry.87  For example, broker-dealers will need to 
study whether existing fee structures comply with a fiduciary 
standard of care, will increase the costs of training to comply 
with fiduciary obligations, and will increase the costs of 
compliance.88  Where firms can afford the costs of compliance, 
costs will shift to consumers in the form of higher fees.89  Where 
firms cannot afford the costs of compliance, costs will shift 
nonetheless, as the loss of less-established firms forces the flight 
to more-established, higher fee firms.90  Insurers argue that their 
business models will be affected as well.91  With existing business 
models built around the sale of variable annuities, requiring 
adherence to a fiduciary standard in the offering and sale of 
securities will require adherence to the same standard by 
insurance professionals, increasing the costs of offering variable 
rate annuities and traditional insurance products to offset the 
cost of compliance.92   
As a reverberating theme, consumers will carry the increase 
in costs—whether or not they receive the benefit of those services 
received—rather than the firms that realize them.93  In short, 
 
85 See id. 
86 Id. at 172–75; ASS’N FOR ADVANCED LIFE UNDERWRITING (AALU), MORE 
ECONOMIC AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO BE REQUIRED IN SEC RULEMAKINGS 
(May 23, 2012), http://aaluwr.org/displayreport.php?wrID=2839. 
87 See Treichel, supra note 70, at 173–74. 
88 See id. at 173 (noting that broker-dealers will have to change their line of 
work to comply with the new standards). 
89 See id. (complying with a new fiduciary standard will be a great expense that 
the investor will bear “in some form or another”). 
90 See id. (arguing that the expense to comply with the new fiduciary standards 
will force broker-dealer firms to shut down, thereby burdening retail investors with 
the task of finding new financial institutions). 
91 Id. at 173–74. 
92 Id. at 174. 
93 See id. 
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while requiring brokers and insurers to adhere to a higher 
standard of care, the costs of complying with such a standard will 
shift to those it is intended to protect, that is, to consumers of 
brokerage, investment advisory, and variable rate annuity 
products, as well as to those that will never see the benefit, that 
is, to consumers of traditional insurance products.94  If Wall 
Street’s arguments were true, an exodus of broker-dealers from 
states that already impose a fiduciary duty would have occurred.   
VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR’S FIDUCIARY STANDARD 
At the same time the federal government and SEC sought to 
propose a new fiduciary duty, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) 
set out to amend its thirty-five-year-old fiduciary rule.95  On 
October 22, 2010, approximately three months after Dodd-Frank 
was signed into law, the Department of Labor sought to amend a 
rule under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”) “that, upon adoption, would protect beneficiaries of 
pension plans and individual retirement accounts by more 
broadly defining the circumstances under which a person is 
considered to be a ‘fiduciary’ by reason of giving investment 
advice to an employee benefit plan or a plan’s participants.”96  
The proposed rule responded to significant changes in the 
financial industry that increased the types and complexity of 
investment products and services available.97  Its purpose was “to 
protect participants from conflicts of interest and self-dealing by 
giving a broader and clearer understanding of when persons 
providing such advice are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary 
standards.”98   
 
 
 
94 See id. at 172–74. 
95 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, US Labor Department Proposes Rule 
Defining ‘Fiduciaries’ of Employee Benefit Plans (October 21, 2010) (on file with U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor). 
96 Definition of the Term “Fiduciary,” 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263, 65,263 (proposed Oct. 
22, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510). 
97 Id. at 65,264. 
98 Id. 
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One year later, on September 19, 2011, the DOL withdrew 
its proposed fiduciary rule99 after criticism from the financial 
industry and lawmakers.100  Opponents argued that the proposed 
rule was too broad and lacked a sufficient cost-benefit analysis.101  
In response, the DOL announced its plan to re-propose a new 
fiduciary rule in early 2012 after a cost benefit/regulatory impact 
analysis.102  In early 2012, the DOL expanded its “regulatory 
impact analysis” to assess what kind of impact the DOL’s re-
proposed fiduciary rule would have on the financial industry, 
which in turn postponed re-proposal to the summer of 2012.103  
Currently, the DOL is in the process of re-proposing a new 
fiduciary rule.   
According to Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of Labor’s Employee Benefit’s Security 
Administration,  
[e]ven if the SEC and DOL collaborated on the same definition 
of fiduciary, it wouldn’t really get [the brokerage industry] what 
they want, which is a single set of rules, because even if the  
 
 
 
 
99 Margaret Collins, Labor Department Will Delay Its Fiduciary Rule, Borzi 
Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2011-09-19/labor-department-will-delay-its-fiduciary-rule-borzi-says.html. 
100 Mark Schoeff Jr., INsider: Timeline for Fiduciary Rule Slip-Sliding Away, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, Jan. 9, 2012, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120109/ 
FREE/120109950 [hereinafter INsider]; Mark Schoeff Jr., Cost Analysis Could End 
DOL Proposal, INVESTMENTNEWS, Apr. 29, 2012, http://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20120429/REG/304299973 [hereinafter Cost Analysis]. 
101 Cost Analysis, supra note 100 (“Skeptics contend that the initial rule that the 
Labor Department proposed in 2010 would subject brokers making individual 
retirement account sales to a fiduciary duty under federal retirement law for the 
first time, potentially pushing them out of the IRA market.”); INsider, supra note 
100; Jessica Toonkel, Labor Department Not Deterred in Fiduciary Rule Proposal, 
REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-labordept-
fiduciary-idUSBRE82I10620120319. 
102 INsider, supra note 100. 
103 Melanie Waddell, DOL Deadline on Fiduciary IRA Request Set for Feb. 24, 
ADVISORONE, Feb. 16, 2012, http://www.advisorone.com/2012/02/16/dol-deadline-on-
fiduciary-ira-request-set-for-feb; see Mark Schoeff Jr., Looming Election Slams 
Brakes on Fiduciary Regs, INVESTMENTNEWS, May 27, 2012, http://www.investment 
news.com/article/20120527/REG/305279994 (re-proposing the rule “as early as this 
summer”); see also Melanie Waddell, DOL’s Borzi: Retirement Fiduciary Re-Proposal 
Out Early Next Year, ADVISORONE, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.advisorone.com/2011/ 
10/25/dols-borzi-retirement-fiduciary-re-proposal-out-ea (re-proposing the rule 
“shortly after the first of the year”). 
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same people were defined as fiduciaries, the rules that they 
would be subject to as fiduciaries in the two different statutory 
schemes would be so very different.104   
Nonetheless, Borzi emphasized that while the two rules “can’t be 
identical”—“they can be consistent and compatible.”105   
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
When new customers walk into a brokerage firm’s lobby for 
the first time, the customers meet a broker and sit down in an 
office for a discussion of their specific needs and goals.  After 
some conversation, if the customers decide to do business with 
the broker, the customers will hand over substantial portions of 
their savings from their life’s work, trusting that the broker will 
handle their funds appropriately.  When this occurs, the broker-
dealer becomes a trusted agent of the customers.  Specifically, 
the customers have placed their trust and confidence in the 
brokerage firm’s ability to adequately manage their money.  At 
the moment the customers deliver all or a substantial portion of 
their net worth to a broker, they justifiably believe, and indeed 
are told, that they can trust that the broker will act as their 
fiduciary.   
Customers that have suffered some type of wrongdoing are 
surprised when Wall Street quickly disclaims any duty owed, let 
alone a fiduciary duty, after litigation or arbitration has 
commenced.  The post-dispute disclaimer of a duty owed to the 
customers is true in virtually all cases defended by broker-
dealers.  A broad based fiduciary duty would help curtail this 
Wall Street practice and help close the credibility gap between 
what is said to customers when their accounts are opened and 
what is argued to arbitrators after a dispute has arisen.   
CONCLUSION 
Today, the SEC and DOL control the fate of whether or not 
there will be a uniform fiduciary standard.  The adoption of a 
uniform fiduciary duty requiring all broker-dealers to act in the 
best interests of their clients and make full and fair disclosures 
 
104 Melanie Waddell, Phyllis Borzi: The 2012 IA 25 Extended Profile, 
ADVISORONE, May 16, 2012, (alteration in original), http://www.advisorone.com/ 
2012/05/16/phyllis-borzi-the-2012-ia-25-extended-profile. 
105 Id. 
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would be a step in the right direction.  A single broad-based 
uniform fiduciary standard would better serve investors by 
enhancing transparency and protecting the integrity of the 
marketplace.  The time for a uniform fiduciary duty is now.   
 
 
